Key Amendments to Egypt’s Competition Act – New Thresholds and Penalties

On 22 April 2026, the Egyptian Parliament approved the new Competition Bill (the “Bill”), which will repeal and replace Law No. 3 of 2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices (the “Competition Act” or the “Act”). The Bill is currently pending presidential approval, and will enter into force three months following its publication in the Official Gazette.

PURPOSE

The Bill significantly expands the scope of the existing law and reflects a broad policy objective that combines strengthening competition with maintaining an investor-friendly environment, while placing particular emphasis on consumer welfare.

AMENDMENTS TO THE EXISTING RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES REGIME

• Revised Threshold for Market Dominance

The current Act deems a company dominant if it (i) holds 25% of the relevant market; and (ii) is able to influence product prices or the level of supply in that market, provided that (iii) competitors are unable to limit that influence. The Bill maintains this test and introduces the rebuttable concept of “presumed dominance” that will apply to any undertaking holding more than 50% market share.

• New Prohibition on Resale Price Maintenance

The Bill codifies the prohibition on resale price maintenance as set out in various Competition Authority guidelines, covering vertical agreements and conduct by dominant undertakings. The current Act provides a blanket ban on anticompetitive vertical agreements. The Bill goes one step further by specifying the types of vertical agreements that will be precluded by law.

GOOD NEWS FOR BUSINESS – NEW THRESHOLDS FOR MERGER NOTIFICATIONS

• New Thresholds for Reviewing Economic Concentrations

The Bill increases the domestic merger notification threshold by raising the combined annual turnover or aggregated assets of the undertakings in Egypt from EGP 900 million to EGP 2.5 billion, provided the annual turnover or aggregated assets of at least two parties to the transaction exceeds EGP 500 million (up from EGP 200 million under the Act). It also raises the combined global turnover or assets threshold from EGP 7.5 billion to EGP 15 billion, on the condition that the aggregated turnover or assets of the target entity in Egypt exceeds EGP 500 million.

• Fee Increases

The Bill doubles the cap on fees for reviewing economic concentration notifications to a maximum of EGP 200,000.

INTRODUCING AMPs AND INCREASING EXISTING FINANCIAL PENALTIES

• Administrative Monetary Penalties for Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominance

The Bill also introduces an administrative monetary penalties (“AMPs”) regime, allowing the Competition Authority to directly penalize parties engaging in anti-competitive practices. AMPs may reach up to 15% of the relevant product’s revenues, or up to EGP 700 million where revenues cannot be ascertained, provided that the AMP does not exceed 10% of the undertaking’s total annual turnover.

AMPs may not be combined with criminal sanctions for the same infringement.

• Administrative Monetary Penalties for Economic Concentrations

AMPs of up to 10% of the annual turnover may be imposed for a party’s (i) failure to notify the Competition Authority of any economic concentration that meets the legally prescribed thresholds; (ii) breach of conditions or obligations attached to a conditional approval; (iii) implementation of a rejected economic concentration; or (iv) failure to notify the Financial Regulatory Authority of any economic concentration that meets the legally prescribed thresholds.

The Bill further demonstrates some flexibility whereby it authorizes a settlement mechanism (capped at 50% of the maximum fine), and the possibility of paying fines in instalments.

A decision to impose AMPs may be appealed to a newly established Grievance Committee within thirty days from the date on which the plaintiff becomes aware of the decision. Grievance Committee decisions may be further appealed to the administrative court.

• Criminal Fines for Anti-Competitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominance

The Bill widens the range of criminal fines for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance. Offending parties risk having to pay between 0.5% and 15% of the relevant product’s revenues, or EGP 10 million and EGP 700 million where revenues cannot be ascertained.

The current regime applies differentiated thresholds that vary based on the nature of infringement. Whereas horizontal agreements are subject to fines ranging from 2% to 12% of the relevant product’s revenues (or EGP 500,000 to EGP 500 million where revenues could not be ascertained), the fine for vertical agreements and abuse of dominant position ranges from 1% to 10% (or EGP 100,000 to EGP 300 million in cases where revenues could not be ascertained).

Furthermore, for the first time, the Bill empowers courts to suspend the operations of the convicted party for up to one year in addition to the abovementioned penalties, which can be extended to five years in case of recidivism.

• Criminal Fines for Economic Concentrations

The Bill imposes the same range of fines for obtaining clearances through false or misleading information, although it omits the current Act’s fallback fine range (EGP 30 million to EGP 500 million) where turnover cannot be ascertained.

By contrast, gun jumping, closing unauthorized transactions, and ignoring conditional approvals are covered by the newly introduced AMP regime.

AMENDMENTS TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF EXEMPTIONS – PRIORITIZING CONSUMER BENEFIT

• New Leniency Regime for Whistleblowers

Under the current regime, leniency for whistleblowers is only permitted in cases of horizontal agreements. The Bill expands the scope of the leniency program to cover all types of anti-competitive agreements. It also introduces immunity against AMPs for whistleblowers, and partial immunity for certain cooperative applicants.

• New Exemptions Regime for Vertical Agreements

The current Act allows concerned parties to request exemptions from certain anti-competitive horizontal agreements when they aim to achieve economic efficiency or where consumer benefits outweigh the negative effects of restricted competition. The Bill applies this exception to vertical agreements as well.